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The international nexus of security and economic cooperation is a 
complicated issue especially between countries that are in asymmetric 
positions like Vietnam and the People Republic of China (China). Living 
next to a giant neighbor has been creating Vietnam both challenges and 
opportunities in the past two thousand years since the first independent 
state form of Vietnam was established. The challenge for Vietnam is how 
to successfully perform its political maneuvering to get the most benefits 
from economic cooperation and at the same time not to damper its 
ideological independence and sovereignty.
This thesis looks into two aspects acting as two separated, but also mutual-
affected case studies, the South China Sea disputes (security) and the Belt 
Road Initiative (BRI) (economic cooperation). By qualitative analysis, I 
wanted to give a thought on how a small and weak country (Vietnam) can 
manage in the challenging situation when putting the economic benefits 
and the territorial rights (from Vietnam’s point of view) on the same scale.
The thesis concludes that Vietnam has faced a greater challenge in joining 
the BRI and the actual implementation of the BRI in Vietnam has been still 
very slow. The Vietnamese government is willing to support the BRI as 
long as they can get benefits from the BRI, while not dampening its 
political motivation and persistence with their agenda on the South China 
Sea. Vietnam is therefore hedging its position towards the PRC.
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Introduction
Vietnam has a long history of being colonized by its northern neighbor China. After 
over 1000 years of being a colony starting under the Han dynasty (202 BCE – 220 
CE), Vietnam’s first independent state was established in 938 AD by King Ngo 
Quyen. Since then it has been relentlessly reinforcing and protecting its sovereignty 
and national identity against China and other colonists.
The territorial conflicts have been an essential issue in the foreign agenda between 
China and Vietnam. Tensions in territorial claims remain as the painful topic that 
has never healed despite the massive improvements in Vietnam- China relationship 
from being rivals to comprehensive partners.
Since the disputes on the land boundary and the Tonkin Gulf were peacefully settled 
down by demarcation and treaty between the two countries more than twenty years 
ago, the re-arise of the South China Sea disputes (Paracel and Spratly Islands) have 
been causing worrying concerns about the security dynamics of South East Asia. 
Although the two countries have been interacting and cooperating significantly, 
conflicts on the South China Sea still act as a determinant defining the bilateral 
economic connection and affect the two states policies toward their each other.
In this thesis, I want to have a thorough look into the influence of the South China 
Sea disputes on the economic cooperation between China and Vietnam. The bilateral 
economic cooperation here is from Vietnam’s side. At the moment, the way how 
Vietnam will react to and get access to the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) in the context 
of the South China Sea territorial disputes remain unsettled. It is against this 
background that this thesis is written. 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework: The nexus of Security 
and Economic cooperation in East Asia and Southeast 
Asia.
Despite the fact that East and Southeast Asia have been free of war since 1979, 
countries in this region are not absolutely secured with peace (Avery & Edward, 
2012). In fact, the interstate disputes and conflicts with the use of military force have 
been continuing in the region. Because of the close alliances between the United 
States and Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam, the conflicts related to 
the maritime territorial disputes in East and Southeast Asia have the potential of 
escalation and attract the participation of powerful states. Obviously, maritime 
territorial disputes render the contemplation of the way in which economics and 
security in East and South East Asian bond. Economic interest may influence 
military security relations, and on the other hand, military-security interests also 
condition the regional economic relations. Economic benefits, which need a peaceful 
context to develop, may discourage the territorial disputes in the South China Sea 
and check them from escalating into military conflict. However, is it true that since 
the economic cost of the war is so high and no one wants war, that states can claim 
maritime rights without being in fear of escalation into wars?
There are various theoretical perspectives on the relationship between security and 
international economic relations. This chapter introduces two opposing viewpoints 
on the relationship between security and international economic relation that are 
from the liberal and realist schools of international relations theory.
Liberals argue that interstate conflicts and the escalation of disputes are discouraged 
by the extensive economic interdependence (Stein (1993); Doyle (1997); Mansfield 
and Pollins (2001)). To support this argument liberals pointed out the mechanism 
that can be used to explain the political-economic-military relation in East and 
Southeast Asia. One typical instance that liberals usually utilize is that the 
cooperative political relations would be fostered when governments’ contacts and 
communications are promoted, as well as when the private actors interactions are 
enhanced (Doyle (1997); Hirschman (1977); Stein (1993); Viner (1951)). There are 
a plenty of reasons to prove that the extensive economic interaction in this region 
has encouraged international contacts although it is unknown if this international 
contact contributes greatly to political cooperation or not. In addition, liberals 
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emphasize that international trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) make a 
significant contribution to wealth and growth. State-owned enterprises, private 
sectors and individuals enjoy benefits from these gains. When the international trade 
is open, these actors become more dependent on the foreign markets, thus these 
economic actors have a certain influence on their governments to undermining 
military conflict and sustaining economic relations among opponent states. As the 
famous quote of Montesquieu puts it: “…the natural effect of commerce is to lead to 
peace. Two nations that trade together become mutually dependent: if one has an 
interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling; and all unions are based on 
mutual needs.” (quoted in Hirschman (1977), p.80).
However, arguments on the relation between economic cooperation and security by 
liberals has received a lot of criticism. Firstly, it is observed that a state’s security 
can be adversely impacted by open trade and extensive economic interdependence. 
Gains from trade are always distributed disproportionately to states and it renders 
the interstate’s conflict (Hirschman (1980); Gilpin (1981)). Albert Hirschman (1980) 
in his study made a conclusion that political dependence and domination can be 
fostered by trade relations. He explained that open trade generate efficiency that 
support military capacity of the states. It also increases the cost of any interruption 
in the interstate commercial relationships. Trade partners find it troublesome to 
replace economic exchange. It’s also costly to shift from this partner to another 
partner especially for the one who is weaker and more dependent on ones 
counterpart in the commercial relations. It is common for states to boost their power 
by shifting to trade with smaller and poorer partners who badly need commerce and 
income.
From the viewpoints of realists, Miles Kahler (1995) argued that although economic 
institution in East and Southeast Asia have fostered interdependence between 
economies, these institutions have failed in dampening conflicts in the region as 
liberals argue. At the same time, Benjamin Cohen (1973) argued that the function of 
economic cooperation on preventing military tension was doubtful. And the fact is 
that security frictions both in underlying and active forms are happening in East and 
Southeast Asia. However, Cohen also said that attempts on financial cooperation 
improvement over the long term may help decrease political hostility. Realists 
accuse liberals of favoring the impacts of economic cooperation on political-
security-military relations, while they do not pay close attention to the counter effect 
of political-security-military relations on economic relations.
In addition, realists have a long traditional belief that a liberal international economy 
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and the extensive interdependence may lead a single state to become powerful 
enough to control the global system (Krasner 1976; Gilpin 1981&1987).
Scholars have been researching on the territorial disputes in East and Southeast Asia 
to determine the intensity and intractability of economic and security interests there. 
Zhang (2012) in his survey about the maritime disputes of China, Japan and other 
neighbors, concluded that the abilities of related parties to restrain their 
disagreement and to resolve the disputes are various. Zhang linked these variations 
to the origins of the disputes, the extent that the economic and political relations 
may be at risk, and the difference between disputes on the land borders and in the 
sea. Zhang concluded that relevant parties would keep fostering negotiations that 
would limit the possibility of military conflict and these dialogues should finally 
lead to settlements. Zhang also added that the bond between economic and security 
interest is the origin of conflict and also is the incentive for cooperation.
In Asia, the rapid rise of China as an economic power and its extensive trade with 
neighbor countries has made these nations become more dependent on China. This 
provides the leverage for China to adversely influence their national securities. The 
fact that China’s increased spending on modernizing military has given rise to 
speculation on China’s influence on the regional security and on the scenario when 
China replaces the world’s sole superpower position held by the United States and 
becomes dominant in Asia. (Zhang, 2012)
Since the end of the first decade of this century until before the China-U.S trade war 
erupted, China and the United States had shown the characteristic of countries 
whose economies became increasingly interdependent (Avery & Edward, 2012). 
According to liberals, this kind of relationship is beneficial to both countries since it 
creates the incentives for sustainable cooperation. However, liberals also warn that 
such interdependence may cause conflict when one party enjoy its benefit on the 
expenses of the other party. After the global economic crisis eruption in 2008, 
observers started to pay closer attention to the nexus of economic and security affair 
as this nexus performed evidently during the crisis, especially when China was the 
least damaged one. In 2009-2010, scholars started to comment on their observation 
about China’s assertive actions to support its territorial claims in the South China 
Sea and East China Sea. Analysts explained this apparent change in China’s 
behavior as the decrease in economic power of the United States during the crisis 
and as the consequences from the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Beijing’s strength 
was growing more rapidly than calculated (Glaser & Dooley (2009); Glaser& 
Morris (2009); Swaine (2011); Swaine& Fravel (2011)). 
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American internal and global power decline paved the way for China to press harder 
on her regional interests. Whether this argument was objective in describing the 
change in China’s foreign policies or they were simply subjective opinion, the new 
perception on China’s power and the new order was widespread. Those who 
considered China’s rising power worrisome, started their cooperation with China in 
the ways that were not beneficial to China’s security and limited the benefits that 
China can get from their robust economic relation. That was the reason why Beijing 
kept firmly repeating their commitment to “peaceful development” (heping fazhan) 
by emphasizing the essential basis of a stable security for its own continuous 
economic rise and for the common prosperity (Dai, 2010).
China’s increasing military power will encourage its leaders to be more aggressive 
on their foreign policies with neighbors. This articulates concerns on the high 
possibilities of conflicts with neighbors or with the United States which shows 
strong interest in Asia Pacific. It is difficult to confirm the speculation that Beijing 
leverages economic power to exert political pressure on parties who are in a conflict 
with it. However, in the case of Japan, China halted the export of rare-earth minerals 
to Japan when the two countries had a diplomatic standoff (2010). These actions 
raised the broader security concerns about the negative side of China’s rapid 
growing power in Asia. The combination of vast territory, large population with 
proud nationalism, rapid technological development, quickly growing economy and 
strong central leadership make China become the significant worrisome source of 
regional (in)security. Despite the fact that Beijing had by 2010’s resolved most of its 
territorial conflicts and sovereignty disputes, thorny conflicts still remain with its 
neighbors Japan, Vietnam, India and notably Taiwan. Furthermore, if conflicts ever 
occur between China and countries in East Asia or Southeast Asia, American 




This research is about two main concepts: The South China Sea conflicts and the 
Belt Road Initiative. These two concepts can be analyzed as two case studies and the 
methodology for each case study is different. 
The South China Sea is an old and long time researched topic by both international 
and Vietnamese researchers. There is a large amount of research and books about 
the South China Sea and the territorial conflicts between claimants. However, 
because of the secretive nature of the Vietnamese state it is difficult to get 
information from the top leaders or elites of the Vietnamese government, therefore 
the sources I used are mainly from scholars, critics, observers, journalists, etc. The 
information released from the government official websites or announcements are 
on the diplomatic surface, most of the announcements carry the same diplomatic 
content.
I used Qualitative method to examine sources as following: historical texts, 
researches on the South China Sea disputes; Journals and researches on current 
situations in the South China Sea. The sources used are mainly in English and 
Vietnamese. The sources will be diversified in term of scholars and nation of 
origins.
The BRI is easily defined in terms of geographic area, but not so easily defined in 
terms of the investment or cooperation content. The reason for this is that the 
information from the BRI partners is either unmatched, too classified or that kind of 
information is not released at all. However, from official Vietnamese government 
documents released in 2015 it can be defined that Vietnam and China cooperation 
are in five categories: Infrastructure, Commercial zone in the border area, Power 
plants, Finance, and Policies.
Because Vietnamese government does not really release either the data on projects 
or investment portfolio under the BRI, this research is based on:
- Official announcements after state visits between Vietnamese and Chinese 
top leaders
- Information on BRI that are published on news, government websites both 
from Vietnam and China sides
- Researches by World Bank and Asian Development Bank
- Researches by scholars on this topic
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According to Pham (2019), the following projects in Vietnam that are categorized 
under the BRI: The TCOB (Two Corridors, One Belt). The TCOB was introduced in 
2003 by China with the purpose of promoting the bilateral economic cooperation 
and improving the connectivity between Yunnan, Guangxi with 12 cities and 
provinces in North Vietnam. TCOB was not implemented until it was combined into 
the BRI. Based on the announcement on November 2017, it is defined that China 
and Vietnam had combined the BRI and TCOB (Two Corridors, One Belt). (Le, 
2018) Further, based on the BRI memorandums of China and Vietnam, also these 
following projects are labeled under the BRI: Vinh Tan 1 Power Plant; Intercity 
Railway Cat Linh-Ha Dong; some transportation projects in North Vietnam; and 
Projects under AIIB in South Vietnam. (Pham, 2019)
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Chapter 3: Historical background of the disputes on the 
South China Sea between China and Vietnam
Both China and Vietnam strongly claim for their ownership over the islands in the South 
China Sea. The territory conflict between China and Vietnam on the islands in the South 
China Sea started many decades ago and have not come to an end yet . This conflict is a 
weak point in the diplomatic relation between two countries and it has caused damage to 
the Sino-Vietnam’s mutual trust. On the other hand, Belt Road Initiative (BRI) is a newly 
promoted economic cooperation plan by President Xi. BRI offers country member the 
finance for the economic development mainly on transportation and energy projects. As for 
Vietnam, BRI is a valuable opportunity to boost the domestic economy. However, cautions 
and concern about the ongoing conflicts in the South China Sea are obstacles for Vietnam 
to participate more actively and fully in BRI. 
In chapter 3, I will introduce about the Sino-Vietnam conflict on the South China Sea. Fist I 
will go through the geographical facts of the South China Sea then I will write about the 
background of the disputes between China and Vietnam on the South China Sea
3.1 Geographical facts of the South China Sea
The South China Sea is known as 南海 (Nanhai) in Chinese and Biển Đông (East 
Sea) in Vietnamese (See photo: The South China Sea). The South China Sea is an 
area of partially enclosed waters of 3.5 million square kilometers that spread from 
latitude 3 to 26 north and longitude 100 to 121 east. The South China Sea is 
bounded by ten countries: Vietnam, the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), 
the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, and 
the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). The South China Sea is geographically 
important in the Pacific Ocean in Asia and it determines geo-strategic positions for 
countries in the region (Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, 2010). The South China Sea 
possesses a large number of archipelagoes, islands, islets, etc. Some of the most 
prominent features are the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Pratas, the Natuna 
Islands and the Scarborough Shoal (South China Sea, n.d.). As for archipelagoes in 
particular, the two largest in the South China Sea are the Paracels and the Spratlys. 
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Photo: The South China Sea (also known as Nanhai in Chinese and Biển Đông in 
Vietnamese)
Source: Google Maps
The Paracel Islands which are known as 西沙 (XiSha) in Chinese and Hoàng Sa in 
Vietnamese are around 330 kilometers away from Hainan Island of China and the 
same distance from the eastern coastline of Vietnam (See photo: Paracel Islands). 
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This archipelago spreads over an area of around 15.000 square kilometers on the sea 
surface with a land area of approximately 7.75 square kilometers (Paracel Islands, 
n.d.). The Paracel Islands consist of two clutters of islands- i.e. the Amphitrite group 
and the Crescent group. The Amphitrite group contains six islands which are Woody 
(this is the largest at 2 km long and 1 kilometer wide); Rocky; Tree island; South 
Island, Middle Island; North Island and Lincoln (Lincoln is sometimes included in 
this group). The Crescent group is located 64 kilometers southwest of the 
Amphitrite. The Crescent group has 7 islands: Patte and Robert are the largest ones; 
Triton; Duncan; Money, Drummond; and Passu Keah (Hayton, 2014) (Paracel 
Islands, n.d.). At the present time, the whole Paracel Islands region is occupied and 
controlled by China while claimed by Vietnam. 
Photo: Paracel Islands (also known as XiSha in Chinese and Hoàng Sa in 
Vietnamese)
Source: Google Maps
The Spratly archipelago is more complicated. This archipelago is partly occupied by 
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia but at the same 
time each of these states claims their own sovereignty over it (See photo: Spratly 
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Islands’ Occupation Status). The Spratly archipelago is also known as 南沙 
(Nansha) in Chinese, Trường Sa in Vietnamese, and Kalayaan in Filipino. The 
Spratly Islands are located approximately 754 kilometers away from the Paracel 
Islands and extend over an immense area of 409.000 square kilometers. 
Additionally, the Spratlys comprise a great number of submerged features along 
with 12 main islands and islets. The major islands are Itu Aba and Spratly Island 
(also known as Storm Island). Most of the features in the area near the Spratlys do 
not naturally sustain habitation and economic life and are not qualified for the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the United Nation Convention on Law of the 
Sea UNCLOS
Photo: Vietnam and China’s territorial claims on the South China Sea
Source: The New York Times
France annexed the Spratly islands from 1933 to 1939. Thereafter, Japan occupied 
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them during the World War II. However, in 1951 Japan renounced its territory rights 
over the islands but did not indicate which country would be the heir. Therefore, the 
ROC, the PRC, the Republic of Vietnam (ROV), and afterwards the Philippines, all 
claimed themselves as the owners. From 1947 -1949 the ROC established a garrison 
in Itu Aba, which is maintained until now. Since UNCLOS came into effect in 1982 
and created the concept of 200 nautical miles (370 kilometers) EEZ, the Spratly 
Islands became more desirable for all parties (Kenneth Pletcher, n.d.). Nowadays, all 
features in the Spratlys are occupied by 5 countries, which are: the PRC, Vietnam, 
the ROC, Malaysia and the Philippines. Up to 2016, the status of occupation in the 
Spratly Islands was as follows: 
Vietnam occupies 21 features: (Southwest Cay (Vietnamese: Song Tu Tay), South 
Reef (Da Nam), Petley Reef (Nui Thi or Da Thi), Sand Cay (Son Ca), Namyit Island 
(Nam Yet), Discovery Great Reef (Da Lon), Sin Cowe Island (Sinh Ton), Collins 
Reef (Co Lin), Lansdowne Reef (Len Dao), Sin Cowe East Island (Sinh Ton Dong), 
Ladd Reef (Da Lat), Spratly Island (Truong Sa or Truong Sa Lon),West Reef (Da 
Tay), Central Reef (Truong Sa Dong), East Reef (Da Dong), Pearson Reef (Phan 
Vinh), Allison Reef (Toc Tan), Cornwallis South Reef (Nui Le), Pigeon or Tennent 
Reef (Tien Nu), Barque Canada Reef (Thuyen Chai), and Amboyna Cay (An 
Bang)). 
China occupies 7 features: (Six features in the Spratlys since 1988 (Subi Reef 
(Chinese: 渚碧礁 Zhubi Jiao, Gaven Reef (南薰礁 Nanxun Jiao), Hughes Reef (东
门礁 Dongmen Jiao, Johnson South Reef (赤瓜礁 Chigua Jiao), Fiery Cross Reef (
永暑礁 Yongshu Jiao), Cuarteron Reef (华阳礁 Huayang Jiao), and Mischief Reef 
since 1995). While the Philippines occupies 9; and Malaysia 5; and finally, the ROC 
occupies only 1; (Alexander L.Vuving, 2016). (See photo: Vietnam and China’s 
territorial claims on the South China Sea)
The South China Sea is the main route for maritime transportation connecting the 
Pacific and the Indian Oceans, Europe and Asia, and the Middle East and Asia. This 
is the second most bustling maritime transportation route in the world. The South 
China Sea has contributed significantly to the world’s economic growth as a large 
portion of commercial merchant ships passes through these waters. The Energy 
Information Administration estimated in 2013 that one-third of world’s oil and half 
of the world’s natural gas were transported through the Straits of Malacca in the 
South China Sea heading to China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Japan and 
South Korea are heavily relying on the South China Sea for their energy supply 
transportation. For Japan, to keep the lights on, they require four million barrels of 
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oil daily and 400.000 cubic meters of natural gas to be delivered through the South 
China Sea (Hayton, 2014). All East and Southeast Asian countries are vulnerable to 
any energy disruptions in the supply. In 2008, 85 percent of China’s energy 
consumption came from oil from which half was imported, and 85 percent of this 
imported oil was carried through the South China Sea. In other words, 36% percent 
of China’s energy supply crossed the South China Sea. In addition, the South China 
Sea contains a large number of natural resources ranging from undiscovered oil 
fields to hydrocarbon fields and rich fishing grounds (South China Sea, n.d.) 
(Hayton, 2014).
The South China Sea has played a significant role in Vietnam’s national defense in 
the past and present. Vietnam has a long coastline of 3260 kilometers from North to 
South and owns around 3000 islands including Paracel and Spratly islands (2). 
Vietnam has 63 provinces in which 28 provinces have coastline (Vietnamese 
Foreign Ministry, 2010).
3.2 Timeline of main historical events related to China and 
Vietnam in the South China Sea since 1974 until now 
(2019)
The harmonious relationship between China and North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam -DRV) lasted in the late 60s and early 70s as DRV got supported by China in the 
civil war against South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam-RVN). This harmony faded and 
ended in a chain of incidents that happened in 1974. Starting with China forcefully 
expelling RVN from Crescent Group (island) in the Paracel Islands that they occupy still to 
this day; the mass expulsion of the Hoa Vietnamese ethnic group by the unified Vietnamese 
state after 1975; and the borderland and the Tokin Gulf tensions in late 70’s which made 
the strained bilateral relations reach a climax when the Sino-Vietnamese border war 
occurred in 1979. This Sino-Vietnam war was the landmark for the official break-up in 
China-Vietnam relations.
On the 19th of January 1974: Chinese troops took over the Crescent group in the Paracel 
Islands from the South Vietnamese. China occupied the whole Paracel archipelago and still 
holds it to this day. As mentioned above, the Paracel archipelago has two groups of islands: 
Amphitrite and Crescent. In the time of 1974, the Amphitrite group was controlled by PRC 
and the Crescent group was occupied by ROV. In the same period, the relationship between 
China and North Vietnam became sour. Chinese spokes personnel reinforced China’s 
sovereignty claim over the whole the Paracel islands to the international public, but no one 
in Saigon acknowledged it. The Chinese had been preparing the takeover of the Crescent 
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Group by sending hundreds of soldiers there gradually since mid-December of 1973. The 
South Vietnam did not know what was really happening in the Paracel Islands until early 
January of 1974. On 14 January 1974, the clashes occurred and continued for one week 
until the South Vietnamese troops were badly defeated and arrested. The Crescent group 
fell to Chinese occupation and the PRC formally annexed the whole Paracel Islands until 
today, while Vietnam still strongly claims her sovereignty over it. The event of 1974, when 
China took over the Crescent group by force, awoke the South Vietnam government. They 
rushed to strengthen their troops in the Spratly Islands by sending 120 troops to the five 
occupied islands. On the other hand, North Vietnam had been publicly keeping silent about 
the battle in the Paracels. The differences in political ideology with China rendered Hanoi 
closer to the USSR, this made the PRC concerned to be encircled by Moscow and Vietnam. 
From Beijing's perspective, whoever controls the Paracel islands and the waters around 
them posed a threat to China. This reason motived China to ignite this battle and to take 
control over the whole the Paracel archipelago. (Hayton, 2014)
Until January 1988 the Vietnamese government had been securing with what they 
possessed in the Spratlys since they had occupied islands that were worth occupying. They 
controlled every feature that were not submersed at high tide. However, the Vietnamese 
underestimated the Chinese naval forces and were content with their advantages on 
Spratlys. In the early February 1988, a Chinese naval force arrived on Fiery Cross, which 
was regarded as dangerous and valueless by the SRV. Only in 9 days the Chinese built up 
8000 square meters of dry land on this reef. On 18 February the Chinese took a further step 
to Cuarteron Reef which was the only feature that was not occupied by the Vietnamese of 
London reefs. On 14 March 1988, Vietnamese successfully occupied Collins and 
Landowne which they have been occupying to this today. The disaster happened on 
Johnson Reef (Chigua in Chinese and Da Gac Ma in Vietnamese) which is less than 2 
kilometers north of the Collins Reef. What exactly happened on the Johnson Reef is 
controversial even today, but the end result was the death of 64 Vietnamese soldiers and a 
Chinese victory over the Johnson Reef conflict. By 8 April 1988 China had succeeded in 
occupying Fiery Cross, Cuarteron, Johnson, Kennan, Subi Reef and Gaven Reef in Spratly 
Islands  (Hayton, 2014). One may ask what is the motivation of China with these moves. At 
that time, they were not sure whether they could get oil, fish or to be able to build bases 
there or not. It was a certainty however that China was successful in preventing other 
countries from consolidating their position in the Spratly Islands. It should be noted that 
between the years of 1975 to 1995, Vietnam was internationally isolated and only country 
that confronted the territory disputes on the South China Sea against China. After this 
period, China’s expansion on the South China Sea had encroached into the waters claimed 
by other countries in Southeast Asia.
The year 1986 was a historic time for Vietnam as it adopted the economic reform in the 6th 
Congress of the Communist Party. Since then Vietnam has developed the desire for 
rapprochement with China. This decision was made in the context that Vietnam was in 
22/64
isolation internationally and domestically the economy was stagnant. On the 23rd of October 
1991, the Paris Peace agreement for Cambodia was signed which removed tensions 
between China and Vietnam. The two countries declared the normalization of the bilateral 
relation on the 5th of November 1991 at a summit in Beijing.
A number of events relevant to the South China Sea dispute took place in 2009 – 2010. In 
2009 China submitted the so called 9 dash-line map to United Nations and then released the 
passport bearing the 9 dash-line map which indicates the whole South China Sea as 
Chinese territory. In May 2009 Malaysia and Vietnam submitted a joint request to the 
United Nation Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf to expand their continental 
shelves to two hundred nautical miles from their coastlines in accordance to UNCLOS. On 
the 23rd of July 2010 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaffirmed the U.S.’s neutral 
stance on sovereignty in the South China Sea, but she stated that the U.S. was interested in 
the “open access to Asia’s maritime commons” or in other words the freedom of navigation 
on the waters in accordance to the international law (The South China Sea, 2011).
In May 2011 the survey ship Binh Minh 02, which belong to Petro Vietnam and CGG 
Veritas, was working in Block 148, 120 kilometers east of the port Nha Trang of Vietnam. 
On 26 May 2011, three China Marine Surveillance (CMS) ships, numbers 12, 17 and 84, 
approached from the horizon and then closed in on Binh Minh 02. Although Binh Minh 02 
was guarded by a pair of fishing trawlers, the entire 17.000 meter cable trailing behind Binh 
Minh 02 was not protected. CMS ship 84 purposely cut across the cable. It was fortunate 
for the Vietnamese that the multi-million dollar Binh Minh 02 was equipped with 
emergency floats that brought the cable to the surface for recovery. The damage was 
repaired and the Binh Minh 02 was sent back to the sea one week later, accompanied by 
eight escorts. (Vụ tàu Bình Minh 02 bị cắt cáp gây bức xúc, 2011)
Two weeks later after this incident, another clash happened between Vietnamese and 
Chinese ships. This time the Veritas Viking 02 which was partly owned by Petro Vietnam 
and Talisman-a Canadian Company. While the Veritas Viking 2 was working in Block 
136-03 in the most southeast of Vietnam claimed EEZ, it was attacked by an vessel from 
China’s Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC). A group of Chinese sailing boats 
came into the survey area and remained there although Vietnamese warned them to leave. 
On the following day, Viking was encircled by two FLEC ships, the 3030 and the 301, 
Viking’s streamers were sailed across by Chinese trawler number 62226 this caused the 
trawler to snag its net and was dragged backwards. The FLEC rushed to help the trawler 
and cut open the streamer, this act was explained by Chinese as self-preservation. (Trung 
Quốc phá cáp tàu thăm dò của Việt Nam, 2011)
In the first half of 2011 three incidents occurred on the South China Sea, in which two 
incidents were related to Vietnamese provoked outcries and criticism on China’s bullying 
around the South China Sea. After 2011, three more incidents happened. Binh Minh 02’s 
23/64
cables were cut for a second time in late November 2012 near the Paracel Islands. Two 
other similar incidents happened in the Malaysian EEZ off Borneo on 21 August 2012 and 
on 19 January 2013 (Trung Quốc lại làm đứt cáp tàu Bình Minh 02, 2012). Moreover, on 
the 25th of September 2012 China launched its first aircraft carrier- Liaoning which was 
stated to protect China’s national sovereignty. (China’s first aircraft carrier enters service, 
2012)
In 2014: China started land reclamation and island building. China said that these actions’ 
purpose is for the improvement of the conditions for the inhabitants living and working on 
these islands. (Tiezzi, 2014) Later, China would argue that the expansion on land 
reclamation and island building were for the benefits of the international community as 
bases for “maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine science 
and research, meteorological observation, navigation safety and environmental protection 
and especially satisfying the need of necessary military defense” (Lye& Ha, 2018)
In May to July 2014 China also deployed its oil rig HaiYang ShiYou 981 owned by the 
China National Petroleum Cooperation for 75 days in the waters off Triton island (in the 
Paracel Islands) which Vietnam claims as its own. (Trung Quốc đặt giàn khoan trái phép 
trên Biển Đông, 2015)
In 2016 the presence of China in the South China Sea was noticeably enhanced. In January 
2016, an Airbus of China Southern Airline landed on the runway on Fiery Cross Reef in 
Spratly Islands. On the 14th of February 2016 China deployed surface-to-air missiles on 
Woody Island, the largest feature in the Paracel Islands. This action was argued by China as 
a right for defending its sovereignty (Beijing places missile launchers on disputed South 
China Sea islands, n.d.). A Chinese navy patrol plane evacuated three sick workers from 
Fiery Cross Reef in April 2016. Three months later, in July 2016, China Southern airline 
landed on Mischief Reef and Subi Reef in Spratly Islands. 
On the 12th July 2016, the Philippines were ruled in favor in its case against China by the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration. The tribunal ruled that China’s 9 dash-line declaration was 
not based on any legal basis. In addition, the court ruled that none of the land features 
occupied by China in the Spratly archipelago were qualified to generate 200 nautical mile 
EEZ in accordance with UNCLOS. The court also said that China seriously violated the 
Philippines’s maritime sovereignty and violated obligations of preserving and protecting 
the maritime environment under UNCLOS (Erickson, 2016) (Arbitration on the South 
China Sea: Rulings from Hague, n.d.)
In December 2016, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative released the image to show that 
China had installed defense capabilities with large anti-aircraft guns and close-in weapons 
system, totally 14 outposts in South China Sea (Lye & Ha, 2018). In this year, Chinese 
defense ministry spokesperson emphasized that it was necessary for China to construct 
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military facilities on islands in the South China Sea and asserted China’s rights to declare 
an Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea (Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 
Lu Kang’s Remarks on Issues Relating to China’s Construction Activities on the Nansha 
Islands and Reefs, 2016).
In addition to the militarization of the disputed waters, in July 2017 and March 2018, China 
threatened to use force if Petro Vietnam kept allowing Repsol -a Spanish oil firm under the 
contract of oil drilling with Vietnam - to continue their drilling project Red Dragon in two 
offshore blocks which is in Vietnam’s 200 nautical mile EEZ and also overlapped with the 
waters in China’s nine-dash line. The result was that Repsol halted their project and 
Vietnam had to seek compensation for Repsol.(Hayton, 2014)
April 2018: China conducted massive military exercises near Hainan Island. In May 2018, 
China landed its H-6K long-range strategic bomber on Woody Island (Paracles). Also in 
this month, China also implemented its anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles 
on their three artificial islands in Spratlys (Mischief, Fiery and Subi reefs) (Storey, 2018).
In April 2018, PetroVietnam admitted that the tensions in the South China Sea between 
China and Vietnam badly affected its production and exploration in offshore waters (Petro 
Vietnam: căng thẳng trên biển đông sẽ ảnh hưởng đến hoat động dầu khí, 2018). However, 
everything appeared calm in terms of diplomacy between China and Vietnam. In the state 
visit to Hanoi in April 2018, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his counterpart Pham 
Binh Minh reiterated the two countries’ commitment to peacefully resolve disputes on the 
South China Sea and proactively increase cooperation (Trong Thanh, 2018).
25/64
Chapter 4: How has Vietnam responded to China’s actions 
in the South China sea ?
The South China Sea plays an important role in the defense strategy and economies of 
many countries in East Asia and South East Asian. In 2009 China submitted its 9-dash-line 
map to claim its territorial right to 90% of the South China Sea. Since then until today, 
China has been assertive in this water area by building artificial islands and deploying 
military bases there. Vietnam is one of the most active countries who has taken reaction 
against China’s actions on the South China Sea. The Vietnamese’ responses are various. 
This chapter will analyze how the Vietnamese respond to China’s actions on the South 
China Sea.
4. 1 Vietnamese public’s reaction to China’s actions in the 
South China sea since 2009
The anti-China sentiment has been always strong among the Vietnamese because of a long 
history of being colonized by China for one thousand years. In modern day history, 
Vietnam was divided into two rival states until its unification in 1975 as it is today. The 
Vietnam-China diplomatic relations have had ups and downs throughout times. Since 2009 
until now, China has become active in claiming their territorial rights in the South China 
sea. The chain of events described above: China releasing the new passport with the U-
shape line map (2009); cutting Binh Minh 02’s cable twice (2014 & 2015,) and placing the 
Haiyang Shiyou 981 in the disputed waters (2014), provoked street protests in Ho Chi Minh 
City and Hanoi. The crowds with banners in Vietnamese and English said “The Paracel and 
Spratly islands belong to Vietnam” or the big X drawn over the U-shaped line. The crowds 
chanted and demanded the Vietnamese government to do more to protect the country's 
territorial rights.
It can be observed from these protests that they were not only a confrontation against 
China, but also a challenge to the Vietnamese Communist Party. From the Party’s 
perspective, these protests could become riots and probably threaten the Party’s legitimacy. 
Therefore, the government suppressed the freedom of expression of public rather than 
risked the domestic and international stability. Although the Vietnamese government made 
massive efforts to suppress the media in news coverage on the South China Sea to prevent 
“injecting anti-China sentiment” into public, still the anti-China sentiment seemed to grow.
The reaction of the Vietnamese Communist Party can be explained by the idea that their 
legitimacy today was built up partly from China’s help with ideological inspiration, rockets 
and rice during almost all of the twentieth century. It is argued that it is this political debt to 
Beijing explained for the Vietnamese Communist Party’s appeals the anti-China sentiment 
among Vietnamese public. If the Vietnamese developed an anti-China sentiment, this 
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would also mean that they would object the ruling party, the Vietnamese Communist party. 
By street demonstration, the protestors can show their patriotism and at the same time 
question the legitimacy of the Vietnamese Communist Party which gain their power partly 
thanks to Chinese support in the past and currently the two parties still have strong 
ideological comradeship. 
Another explanation for the reaction of the Vietnamese Government can be that they tried 
to maintain the internal and international stability of the environment for economic 
cooperation development, and therefore tried to prevent any riots which could ruin the 
image of Vietnam as a reliable place for foreign investment. This argument came from the 
angle of economic benefits that could be destroyed in a hostile environment. 
In my opinion, the reaction of the Vietnamese Government to the public anger in this event 
could be explained by observing their calculations on both political legitimacy and the 
economic benefits. It was interesting to see how the Vietnamese government’s attitude 
toward China has fluctuated according to the quality of their bilateral relation. The 
following example can be seen as a testimony to this argument about a decade after the 
incident of 1979 border war when relations between China and Vietnam went from bad to 
worse. The Vietnamese government made a propaganda campaign on the image of Le Dinh 
Chinh, an 18-year-old hero who sacrificed his life in the clash with China on Jonhson Reef 
in 1988. Right after the incident a few months later, the Vietnamese state published a 
eulogizing book on his heroic life and his patriotic sacrifice. His name was used to name a 
street, a school and children were encouraged to emulate his example. However, when the 
relationship became normalized in 1990, the story of Le Dinh Chinh became ignored and 
blurred, and gradually it became the embarrassment for Hanoi. When his death was 
mentioned later, the information on the nationality of his killers were clearly omitted. 
Media were asked to not mention the word “China” in the coverage on him (Hayton, 2014)
4. 2  The Responses of the Vietnamese government on 
China’s actions on the South China Sea
Vietnam so far has been the dedicated claimant on the South China Sea and has been 
proactively responding to China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea. Vietnam has 
been using measures that were not regarded as high profile, but significantly from the 
perspectives of a small state in fighting for its territorial integrity and national sovereignty. 
Vietnam so far has been using different measures in opposing China actions on the South 
China Sea. According to Lye and Ha (2018) Vietnamese government basically have four 
ways of responses to China’s action in the South China sea: (1) Verbal and diplomatic 
protests; (2) “Internationalization” and “smart” public messaging; (3) Threat of legal 
action; (4) Deepening defense relationship with other countries.
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Verbal and Diplomatic protests
This method has been utilized first and foremost in all diplomatic situations related to 
China’s actions in the South China Sea since 2009.  The content of the message from the 
Vietnamese spokesperson generally contain three points: Firmly state on the legal ground 
and historical evidence to the territorial rights on Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) and Truong Sa 
(Spartly Islands); strongly denounce China’s aggressive and illegal actions in Hoang Sa and 
Truong Sa, these word phases are: “Seriously violates Vietnam’s sovereignty; increases 
tension and instability; not conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and cooperation 
in the East Sea”; etc…. Furthermore, they usually include a call for China to withdraw their 
military from East Sea and comply to the DOC.
On 8th May 2018, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang, in response 
to foreign media on China’s illegal deployment of missiles on Spratly archipelagos (Truong 
Sa), stated that:  “Once again, Viet Nam has sufficient legal grounds and historical evidence 
to affirm its sovereignty over Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos in accordance with 
international law. Viet Nam is deeply concerned about the news and holds that all 
militarized activities, including the installation of missiles on Truong Sa archipelago, 
seriously violate Viet Nam’s sovereignty over the islands, run against Agreement on basic 
principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues between Viet Nam and China and 
Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the East Sea (DOC) between ASEAN and 
China. The move has increased tension and instability in the region and is not beneficial to 
efforts of nations in negotiating a Code of Conduct in the East Sea. Viet Nam requests that 
China, as a major power in the region and the world, show responsibility in the 
maintenance of peace and stability in the East Sea, stop militarization and withdraw 
military equipment illegally deployed on structures under Viet Nam's sovereignty, respect 
Viet Nam’s sovereignty over Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos and strictly abide by 
the Agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues between Viet 
Nam and China as well as the DOC” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 2018)
Just two weeks later, in response to questions from foreign media about China’s exercise 
bomber aircraft in Paracel archipelago, MOFA spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang stated: 
“Viet Nam has full legal grounds and historical evidence to affirm its sovereignty over 
Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos in accordance with international law. China’s 
deployment of bomber aircrafts conducting take-off and landing drills in Hoang Sa 
seriously violates Viet Nam’s sovereignty over the islands, runs counter to the Agreement 
on basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues between Viet Nam – China, 
violates the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC), hampers the 
negotiation between ASEAN and China on a Code of Conduct in the East Sea (COC), 
increases tension and instability in the region, and is not conducive to the maintenance of 
peace, stability and cooperation in the East Sea. Viet Nam requests that China put an end to 
the aforementioned activities immediately, stop militarization, respect Viet Nam’s 
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sovereignty over Hoang Sa, observe the Agreement on basic principles guiding the 
settlement of maritime issues between Viet Nam – China, the Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the East Sea (DOC), and facilitate a favorable environment for the 
maintenance of peace, stability and cooperation in the region." (MOFA, 
2018)(Vietnamnews, 2018)
(2) Internationalize the disputes
In fact, in 2009 in response to China’s submission of the nine dash-line map to the United 
Nations, Vietnam, among other claimants as Malaysia, and the Philippines, submitted the 
counter-claims against China’s claim. Moreover, this event was internationalized when the 
former US secretary of state Hillary Clinton stated that the United States had a “national 
interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for 
international in the South China Sea”. Vietnam had appealed China as the aggressive 
claimant in the South China Sea to the international community and media. In the oil-rig 
standoff 2014 , Vietnam voiced its opposing to China’s act and reaffirm its sovereignty 
over the Paracel Islands by submitting documents to the United Nations. At the same time, 
prior to the opening of the 24th ASEAN Summit in May 2014, Vietnam along with other 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued separated statements on the development in the South 
China Sea. Furthermore, Vietnam invited foreign reporters to express Vietnam’s opposition 
on China illegal action over the oil rig and also to attract international attention (Lye and 
Ha, 2018).
(3) Threaten to use legal action
Vietnam has threatened to use legal action against China. On the occasion to visit Manila in 
2014, Vietnam former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung stated that “Vietnam is 
considering various defense options, including legal actions in accordance with 
international law” to protect its claim in the South China Sea. (“Francisco and Mogato, 
2014). Afterwards, on the sideline of the Shangri-La Dialogue 20141, Vietnam’s Defense 
Minister Phung Quang Thanh said that on one hand Vietnam was seeking to resolve the oil 
rig crisis bilaterally with China, but on the other hand Vietnam was prepared to take other 
solution including taking China to international court. As the Philippines set the example of 
resolving the disputes by taking international course against China, thus Vietnam’s threat of 
using legal actions may concern China. As China kept emphasizing on two countries 
should not internalize the maritime disputes and resolve it bilaterally. (Chua, 2014 )
Western media reported about Vietnam’s readiness for taking legal actions. In the interview 
with Bloomberg, Vietnam Former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said Vietnam has 
1 The Shangri-La Dialogue is an annual security forum hold by an independent think tank-the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The attendees are defense ministers, head of ministries 
of 28 Asia-Pacific states (Wikipedia)
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prepared “all evidence and legal dossiers. What we are considering is the appropriate 
timing”. The New York Time reported in November 2017 that as earlier in 2009 a team of 
researchers lead by historian Tran Duc Anh Son had collected necessary documents and 
maps to support Vietnam’s legal claim in South China Sea (Lye and Le, 2018). Although as 
far as scholars and commentators observed, the Vietnamese authorities were not willing to 
submit a case against China. However, a legal solution was a potential way that Vietnam 
could seek to rely on if China forced Vietnam to do so. Vietnam’s responses depend on 
China’s activities and actions, if Vietnam is pushed harshly, there is no choice, but opting 
for a legal court as part of international law.
(4) Deepening defense relationship with other countries 
Vietnam has been deepening the relationship and partnership with foreign powers like the 
United States, India, Australia and Japan in order to reinforce its defense capacity. 
Especially, Vietnam has been making efforts in strengthening the defense tie with the 
United States. This was marked with the state visit to United State in July 2015 by Nguyen 
Phu Trong- Genneral Secretary of Vietnam. Not long after this, in May 2016, former 
president Barack Obama paid a reciprocal visit to Vietnam. On this trip, President Obama 
approved on lifting of lethal arms embargo against Vietnam. In October 2016, the first ever 
time since the end of the Vietnam War, two American warships USS Frank Cable and USS 
John S. McCain docked at Cam Ranh International port. In March 2018, US aircraft USS 
Carl Vinson arrived to Da Nang for the first time as an American aircraft docking in 
Vietnam since 1975. Also in March 2018, six USA patrol boats were delivered to 
Vietnamese coast joining with another six patrol boats and a high endurance cutter which 
were provided for Vietnam in the previous year.
On the 16th and 17th of October in 2018, the U.S. Defense Minister James Mattis paid his 
second visit to Vietnam. According to scholars, this act showed Washington’s special 
attention to decrease China’s influence in Southeast Asia by strengthening the relationships 
with countries in the region. Mattis’ first visit Vietnam on January was followed by the 
Navy Aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson stopping by Da Nang, this event was the first time a 
military ship of USA stopped by Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam War. It is said that 
this gesture was to show Beijing that USA has been making efforts to warm up the 
relationship with regional partners in the context of China militarizing the South China Sea 
(U.S.Embassy & Consulate in Vietnam, 2018) (Nguoilaodong, 2018). 
Scholars said that Vietnam foreign and defense policy is maneuvering between the USA 
and China, but in these recent years Vietnam tends to fall toward the USA. It is also said 
that in Southeast Asia, other than Singapore, Vietnam is a naturally strategic partner to the 
United States (Asiantimes, 2019). On 30 of May 2018 Vietnam was invited for the first 
time to join the military exercise RIMPAC held by the American Navy forces. This was the 
first time Vietnam was invited to the biggest naval military exercise. In the same time USA 
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withdrew the invitation to China to this every two-year military exercise. This was protest 
to China’s militarization in disputed waters in South China Sea (Star&Stripes, 2018).
Vietnam has been upgrading its partnership with Australia twice since 2015. In April 2018, 
two Australian warships (HMAS Canberra and HMAS Newcastle) arrived in Ho Chi Minh 
City for the first time in 17 years (Vietnamnet, 2019). Like the USA, Australia stated that 
they had a right for freedom of navigation and overflight through international waters in the 
South China Sea. 
At the same time, Vietnam has stepped up defense ties and exchanges with Japan. In 
February 2015, as promised in 2014, Japan delivered six patrol boats to Vietnam. In April 
2016 for the first time since World War II, two Japanese warships docked at Cam Ranh 
International Port. Vietnam and Japan carried joint exercises on search and rescue in 
February 2016 and joint exercise on curbing illegal fishing in June 2017 in the South China 
Sea. Recently in May 2018, both countries issued a joint statement which underlined the 
importance of non-militarization and called for parties to not take unilateral actions that 
could stir the peace and complicate tensions in the South China Sea. (Lye & Ha, 2018)
Vietnam has also upgraded its tie with India to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 
September 2016. Before this, after the oil rig standoff, Vietnam was pledged with four 
patrol vessels by India Prime Minister. In the state visit to Vietnam, Indian Prime Minister 
Modi extended the defense credit to Vietnam up to 500 million USD. In addition, India 
promised to train Vietnamese pilots to operate Sukhoi 30 fighter jets in December 2016 
(Prashanth, 2016).
4. 3 Vietnamese government’s policies and perspectives on 
the South China Sea on the diplomatic surface
According to the foreign ministry of Vietnam 2, it was estimated that the situation in the 
South China Sea would become more challenging. The Communist Party of Vietnam 
would continue:
- Maintaining the peaceful foreign policies to take the best advantages in building 
and developing the country.
- Apply to the UNCLOS and DOC in resolving the disputes on South China Sea. 
- Be persistent on these issues as they are sensitive and complex.
- Be determined in protecting sovereignty and taking use of benefits from waters. 
Following guidance of UNCLOS Vietnam is continuing exploration, and other 
activities on its territorial waters. Vietnam is willing to cooperate with China and 
2  This is generalized from the speeches of the foreign department speaker published on the socialist 
republic of Vietnam, online newspapers of the government: www.baochinhphu.vn
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other countries in South China Sea for activities such as rescue, geological research, 
environment protection, anti-piracy, etc.
- Vietnam’s persistent and thorough policies are to significantly protect and enhance 
the comprehensive cooperation as well was the friendship with neighbors. Vietnam 
is stick on deploying peaceful negotiation in solving disputes in the South China 
Sea.
Speaking of international law on the South China sea, Vietnamese government recognized 
two set of laws that are: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
(UNCLOS) and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 2002 
(DOC).
At the 11th meeting of the Steering Committee for Vietnam - China Cooperation in 
September 2018, the two sides agreed to follow the common understanding of leaders of 
the two countries and two parties as well as the “Agreement on basic principles governing 
the settlement of issues at sea between Vietnam and China”. Two sides also agreed to 
manage the differences concerning sea issues, to refrain from actions that may complicate 
the situation and broaden the dispute, and to maintain peace and stability in the East Sea. 
Previously in an interview, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc also stressed that “ Vietnam 
does not pursue a military buildup, but Vietnam pursues protecting our sovereignty, firstly 
with  peaceful measure, diplomatic measures and even justice measures.” (The Diplomat, 
2016)
Vietnam supports cooperation between countries, including maritime cooperation. Vietnam 
has undertaken bilateral and multilateral cooperation with others, including China in 
various fields such as scientific research, environmental protection, crime prevention, 
economic cooperation, etc. It is Vietnam’s view that maritime cooperation is to conform 
with the regimes and provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, in 
compliance with rights and interests of Vietnam as well as in respect of interests of other 
concerned parties.” (MOAF, 2018)
In my opinion, the Vietnamese government has been a masterful player in the South China 
Sea game with China considering Vietnam capacities on military power, the size of the 
economy, the current geo-political situation. The Vietnamese Government has taken use  all 
available resources at a low cost to react against China’s escalating actions in the South 
China Sea. Clearly the Vietnamese government does not want a actual war or a cold war 
with China because they know  it is harmful and causing damage more to Vietnam side. 
Therefore the Vietnamese government has been focus on using diplomatic method and 
publicly denounced China’s actions in the international forums. On the other hand Vietnam 
has strengthened its relationships with other powerful countries in order to get good support 
when needed. In additions, Vietnam also increase its own national self defense ability. 
These methods have been combined to secure Vietnam a better position in the “fight” with 
China. Until now there has not been actual war or major military clash between China and 
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Vietnam in the South China Sea. However Vietnam has been prepared itself for a scenario 
of a unwanted war or military force use if the conflict cannot be solved by diplomatic 
method. Or in a situation that China would ever provoke military force use in the South 
China Sea, Vietnam will be ready to react.
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Chapter 5: Introduction to China’s Belt Road Initiative
The first idea of the BRI was mentioned by President Xi Jinping in his speech on 7/7/2013 
in Kazakhstan: “….in order to make the economic ties closer, mutual cooperation deeper 
and space of development broader between the Eurasian countries, we can innovate the 
mode of cooperation and jointly build the "Silk Road Economic Belt" step by step to 
gradually form overall regional cooperation…” (Ministry of Foreign Affair of People’s 
Republic of China, 2013). The Belt Road Initiative (Yidai-Yilu) was first announced by 
President Xi Jinping in his state visit to Central Asia on September 2013 when he 
introduced the Silk Road Economic Belt which is to link Chinese less developed Northwest 
provinces with Eurasia and Europe. One month later on October 2013 on his state visit to 
Indonesia, Xi announced the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative which is 
proposed to enhance the maritime connectivity with Eurasia and the Mediterranean Sea by 
the network of ports and railways. The Belt Road Initiative (BRI) has been arguably 
regarded as the biggest economic construction plan of the modern history. With this plan Xi 
called for the connectivity between China and the rest of the world by building an 
intercontinental infrastructure system. As the name of the initiative implies, this grand 
project consists of two parts: the Belt and the Road (See photo: One Belt One Road map). 
The Belt will be a system of rail routes, highways, oil and gas pipelines and other 
infrastructure projects, which will expand from Xi’an in the Central of China through 
Central Asian and Russia to Europe. The Road-the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) consists of a 
system of ports, coastal infrastructure from Chinese coastal cities on the east side reaching 
South East Asia, South Asia, the Gulf, East Africa and the Mediterranean, shaping a curve 
line ending at Piraeus (Greece), Venice (Italy) and Rotterdam (Netherlands) in Europe and 
Mombasa (Kenya) in Africa (Shiam Saran, 2015). The ambitious plan is known as Xi’s 
signature initiative. Along with the rise of Xi as the “core leader”, this initiative is clearly 
the grand project in “Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo meng) of the new Chinese leadership.
On March 2015, the concrete plan of the BRI was released by China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission. The BRI along with six economic corridors (the 
China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, the New Eurasia Land Bridge, the China-
Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic 
Corridor, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the Bangladesh-China-India-
Myanmar Economic Corridor) aims at connecting the continents of Asia, Europe, and 
Africa.
To fund for projects labeled in the BRI, the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) were founded with the initial capital of 40 billion and 100 billion 
USD respectively. China Export Import Bank are also in-cooperated to fund for projects. 
As of January 2017, nine projects under the BRI had been approved and disbursed with a 
total fund of 1.7 billion USD (Weiss, 2017). With the BRI, China can achieve many goals 
which include establishing China’s global power along with reinforcing the legitimacy of 
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the Communist Party; developing the less developed areas in the Chinese hinterland 
provinces; as well as resolving the over productivity and overcapacity of domestic labor by 
exporting them to partners in the BRI (Silk Road bottom-up: Regional Perspectives on Belt 
and Road Initiative, 2017)
The main content of the BRI was written in the document by National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Finance  (MOF) and Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) released on 28/3/2015 with the permission of the State Council of China. The 
document stated five fields that the BRI want to enhance and boost:
Policy coordination
Priority on infrastructure and facilities’ connections
Increase cooperation on trade and investment
Financial integration 
Enhance people-to-people bonds
The BRI is an ambitious initiative of China with multiple aims. This initiative was written 
in one chapter (chapter 51) in the 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020). In the 19th National Congress 
of the Communist Party of China in October 2017, an amendment, with Xi Jinping 
ideology and Belt Road Initiative, was added into the Party charter.
In the first phase, the BRI was mentioned as the initiative to connect infrastructure between 
Asia, Africa and Europe but in the official announcements in recent years this initiative has 
expanded its operation to the North Pole and Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region. 
Until September 2018, 105 countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America and South 
Pacific region have signed 123 cooperation documents under the BRI and 29 international 
organizations signed 26 such documents. Vietnam is one of them. 
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Photo: One Belt One Road map
Source: Lowy Institute
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Chapter 6: The position of ASEAN in BRI and the 
implementation of BRI in ASEAN in the past 5 years 
(2014-2019)
Southeast Asia is an important geo-strategic area to China throughout the history in term of 
economy development, security defense and diplomacy policy. Southeast Asia is the place 
where the large population of ethnic Chinese reside. At the same time, the South China Sea 
in Southeast Asia currently is the only gateway for China to the Indian Ocean. It can be 
seen that Southeast Asia is a significant regional hub in the BRI both on the sea and in the 
hinterland. ASEAN is the beginning point of the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) which aims at 
building the huge connection network of the infrastructure systems on the sea. The MSR 
will help to tie ASEAN more closely with China, while playing an important role in 
making China less dependent on the South China Sea as its only gateway for oil and fuel 
transportation. In fact, 85 percent of Chinese imported energy are transported across the 
South China Sea through Malacca Strait, which is called as the choking point of China in 
the South China sea (Hayton, 2014). 
In the meanwhile, with the MSR, ASEAN’s connectivity becomes greater than before 
thanks to the transit routes which connect ASEAN seaports with the Mediterranean Sea, the 
Indian Ocean and the East China Sea. To build up the MSR, China has been investing in 
the countries which have less developed seaports, such as Cambodia and Myanmar. At the 
same time, China also has invested in countries that have more developed seaports, such as 
Thailand and Malaysia. In ASEAN, China’s investments in transportation has increased, at 
the present there are at least 6 seaports projects, 7 railway projects and 2-3 highway 
projects and more than 10 power projects under construction in the region (Pham, 2019, p. 
101).  
China has been the long-term partner with ASEAN in terms of economic cooperation and 
security defense. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China to ASEAN had increased 
from 600 millions USD in 2003 to 11.3 billions USD in 2017. It was forecasted that this 
number will be 185 billion USD in 2030. From 2013 to 2017, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar were the countries that received the highest volumes 
from Chinese FDI (ASEAN Investment Report 2018- Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Digital Economy In ASEAN, 2018). ASEAN is also the place for China to internationalize 
the Chinese Yuan, which makes China less dependent on the U.S dollars. In 2017, the 
import-export between China and ASEAN was 514.8 billion USD which was increased by 
13.8 percent. Since 2009 China has been the largest trade partner of ASEAN. Meanwhile, 
ASEAN also has been the third largest trade partner of China for seven years in a row 
(CGTN, 2018).
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There are many different estimations on the demand for infrastructure of ASEAN, however 
according to the estimation of Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2017), in the next 5 years 
South East Asia will need about 160 billion USD to invest in the infrastructure, internal 
connection, and regional connections. As of 2017, ASEAN countries have 55 billion USD 
from their own funds, thus there is a gap of 100 billion USD for both public and private 
sectors. Financial institutions of China as AIIB, ASEAN-China Cooperation Fund (ACCF), 
or multilateral development bank (MDB), the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM), 
etc. will allow ASEAN to access greater funds (ADB, 2017).
Since 2014 until 2019, six out of ten biggest projects in the BRI targeted ASEAN (Pham, 
2019, p 239). China has heavily invested in South East Asia with many transportation and 
infrastructure projects. China has been investing in the seaport network in Myanmar, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Cambodia. The seaport projects under BRI in ASEAN 
are Kuantan, Klang (Malaysia), Tanjung Sauh (Batam, Indonesia), Sihanoukville, Koh 
Kong (Cambodia), Kyakpyu (Myanmar). The railway projects includes Preah-Kaoh Kong 
(Cambodia), high-speed railway Jakarta- Bangdung (Indonesia), Vientiane- Boten (Laos), 
ECRL (Malaysia), Gemas-Johor Bahru (Malaysia), Dali- Thuy Le (Myanmar), Kyaukpyu- 
Kunming (Myanmar), Bangkok-Nong Khai (Thailand). Road infrastructure projects 
include: Highway 55 (Cambodia), Highway 58 (Cambodia), Highway Sihanoukville- 
Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Highway Manado-Bitung (Indonesia). Other power plant 
projects are in Laos, Myanmar and Malaysia. Through the BRI, China has been making 
effort to export its technology standards. Standard competition in the field of high-speed 
railway construction is a good example. China and Japan have competed in applying their 
railway standards in South East Asia. So far, China have had the right to invest in railway 
projects in Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. China also achieved 
positive result in exporting high-speed railway construction standards to Laos and 
Indonesia (The Straits Times, 2019). High-speed railway under Chinese standard may 
become the general standard of ASEAN if countries in the BRI take the Chinese standard 
as their national standard. At some time in the future China may dominate the high-speed 
railway construction market and defeat their competitor Japan.
Although the ASEAN countries are interested in the benefits from economic cooperation 
with China, there has been a wide spectrum of interest as well as perception among 
ASEAN about it. Some ASEAN members are skeptical and have misgivings about the rise 
of China as an economy superpower and its expansion in the South China Sea, while others 
are extremely supportive for BRI. Some are outright distrustful (Ghiasi, Fei & Saalman, 
2018).
For Indonesia, President Jokowi announced that his country was on the way to develop into 
a powerful maritime country in the meanwhile China has been building the MSR, therefore 
Indonesia warmly welcome to BRI as a head start in making them become a maritime state 
(Leo Suryadinata, 2014). This largest Muslim country in ASEAN wanted to increase their 
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international power and play the role as the intermediate partner in the South China Sea 
territory conflict, therefore the BRI is the opportunity for Indonesia to realize their 
ambition.
In Cambodia, the influence of China is especially strong. The Royal Family Sihanouk and 
PhnomPenh has been relying on China’s support for a long time. Cambodia is one of the 
countries who strongly and warmly welcomed the BRI. This attitude of Cambodia can be 
understood by observing its economic and social situation and the influence of Chinese on 
this country’s development. Cambodia is among the poorest and least developing countries 
in the world although Cambodia has been enjoying the average yearly 7.5% growth rate 
and the per capita income increased almost three times in 2015 (from 417 USD in 2004 to 
1215 USD) (Worldbank, 2019). Cambodia is among the Southeast Asian countries which is 
seriously in need of infrastructure and investment. Major economic sectors like agriculture, 
tourism and textile industry are the backbone of Cambodia export product. By joining the 
BRI the need for investment and infrastructure can be resolved. Therefore, Cambodia is one 
of the most eager countries for BRI, and it was among the first ones who showed strong 
support and commitment to the BRI and also a cofounder of the BRI. On October 2016 
President Xi paid his state visit to Cambodia and signed 31 contracts including granting the 
new 237 million favor-rated bank loan package and erasing an 89 million USD loan (The 
Cambodia Daily, 2016; China Daily, 2016). Cambodia is very close to China and the 
dominance of China in Cambodia is obvious. At the same time, the infrastructures in 
Cambodia also allow China to strengthen the network of deep seaport connections. Under 
the BRI, China has invested in building two deep sea ports in Cambodia in Sihanoukville 
and Koh Kong. These two seaports are the top development plans of China in Cambodia. In 
exchange for 9.5 billion USD invested in these projects, China gets the right to control one 
fourth of the long coastline of Cambodia. These two projects will become the important 
deep water seaports and international ports of Cambodia in the future.
On the contrary to Cambodia, Vietnam expresses its caution and concerns about China’s 
BRI due to the traditional political distrust and China’s military deployment in the disputed 
waters in the South China Sea discussed above. Malaysia and Thailand belong to the 
middle spectrum of attitude. China and forty other countries and territories had signed the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the BRI by October 2017 (Pham, 2017, p. 103). 
Towards the BRI, these countries are making efforts balance their tight economic 
cooperation with China, while still maintaining their political ideology, territorial 
sovereignty and economic independence (Ghiasi, Fei & Saalman, 2018).
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand were the first receivers of investments from BRI. 
Under Najib Razak administration, Malaysia was among the first to grasp the BRI. During 
the Malaysian president’s state visit to China in November 2016, the two parties signed 
fourteen MOUs with the value of 143.6 billion ringgit (35.9 billion USD). On another state 
visit to China, Najib Razak signed another 30 billion ringit MOU (Wan Saiful & Wan Jan, 
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2017). In BRI forum in Beijing on May 2017, Najib expressed his support for the BRI and 
said that these cooperations were interesting and beneficial to business and creating jobs 
(Chok Suat Ling, 2017). However, the turnabout in Malaysian politics with the coming 
back of Mahathir as the president in 2018 threatened the stable future of the BRI in 
Malaysia. At the present time, these countries seem to be wary of the investment waves and 
is seeking for protection from the negative impacts of these Chinese investment. There has 
been a growing awareness of the risks and unexpected consequences from economic over-
dependence on China, which in the future scenarios can become over-dependence on China 
in term of politic and strategic leverage. 
The Philippines under President Aquino administration the BRI cooperation was delayed 
due to the conflicts on the South China Sea. Since President Rodrigo Duterte took his office 
in 2016. He warmed up the relationship with China and softened the tensions in the South 
China Sea between China and the Philippines in return for the promise of 24 billions USD 
of investment, loan, credit pledge from President Xi Jinping (Pia Ranada, 2016). A few 
months after the Hague tribunal ruled the result in favor for Manila in its file against China 
on the South China Sea, Duterte made a profound about-turn in the Filipino foreign policies 
to separate from its traditional ally (United State) and tow toward China. Duterte is accused 
by his opposition of making geopolitical concession in the South China Sea in return for 
Chinese capital (Chandran, 2018).
The BRI may contribute to the prosperity of ASEAN countries, however its impact on the 
regional stability is inevitable. The BRI has not been viewed merely as an economic 
cooperation, but also as China’s leverage to expand its strategic and political influence. For 
China, in many decades Malacca strait has been regarded as its choking point in the South 
China Sea because this country has been depending on this strait for its imported oil 
transportation from Persian Gulf across the Indian Ocean (Zha, 2018). It is implied that the 
BRI also aims at getting approval from countries in South East Asia and lessening the 
territory tension between them and China. It is worth noting that in the term from 2013-
2015 when China firstly proposed the BRI was also the period when China was increasing 
activities in the South China Sea which included putting oil rig HD981 in Vietnam’s 
claimed waters or built up the artificial islands in Spratly Islands (Pham, 2017, p.44). China 
has been taking use of the card of “building the regional community” to leverage its 
economic, military and political power over its partners. It is not difficult to support this 
argument when looking at what China has been doing so far to extend its economic and 
strategic access all across Asia and Eurasia (Arase, 2015). 
ASEAN is the vital geopolitical knot between China and the USA in the South China Sea. 
The emergence of the BRI in Southeast Asia, of which complicated geo-politics has 
become more important to the rest of the world, has stirred the political stability of this 
region. In the game of the BRI, ASEAN are not only offered opportunity, but also 
encounter challenge on the other hand. One of the challenges for this “mild” political and 
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fragile state-building region is that the bound between nations in ASEAN may be broken 
and these countries will be attracted to poles where superpowers dominate. Southeast Asia 
is the area where superpower countries like the U.S, Japan, India are competing to gain the 
influence. Southeast Asia on the other hand has to balance its relationship with two 
superpowers China and the USA. The Intra-ASEAN disunity keeps growing. ASEAN does 
not have any country that is symmetrically powerful with China, or that has serious impact 
on China. ASEAN also has many country members that have territory conflicts with China. 
ASEAN countries express their concerns over the regional security which is directly 
relevant to territorial disputes on the South China Sea between China and 4 members of 
ASEAN (Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Indonesia). The cohesion and unity of 
ASEAN as a political and economic institution is also a problem when it comes to the issue 
with China. China is rising as the powerful nation and it is replacing the US prominence in 
Asia. Although the BRI has a short history, this initiative has sparked the rivalry from other 
major powers which share the anxiety toward Beijing’s growing influence. The United 
States is among of these major powers which in 2018 introduced for the first time in the 
ASEAN ministerial level conference about its investment package of $113 millions 
(Reuters, 2018). This packaged is announced to cover areas of technology, energy and 
infrastructure. In addition, The United Stated also promised a fund of $300 millions for 
security in Southeast Asia (Xue, 2019). The rivalry between China and USA is defining the 
future of Asia in general. Taking either the side of Beijing or Washington is the obvious 
and hot-debated issue among the South East Asian countries. Some countries are shifting 
toward China and away from the traditional America-led international order.
China emphasizes its role in ASEAN by offers like the BRI to deploy geo-economic and 
geo-strategic influence on this region. The attraction from the Chinese economy makes the 
network of businesses moving around it, which encourages the economic development and 
investment cooperation. This mechanism causes difficulty for small and weak countries in 
balancing the influence of China. In addition, the influence of China makes the bond among 
nations in South East Asia weaker. Chinese initiative may cause internal conflicts within 
countries or between nations in ASEAN. China is not experienced in multi-lateral 
relationships and prefers the bilateral way of dealing with each country in ASEAN, thus the 
unity of ASEAN has been divided. Since 2012 until now it seemed that ASEAN became 
divided when managing their perspectives and became passive in issue related to other 
members of the association.
China always suggests and asks countries to take loans for infrastructure that go beyond 
their need and financial abilities. This is beneficial to China since (1) China can export their 
capital with high interest compared to investing in other channels, (2) export Chinese 
technology, (3) export Chinese labor, (4) create the markets for the domestic enterprises, 
(5) cause political influence to debtor countries, and (6) look for strategic benefits (Pham, 
2019, p363).
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In recent years, the resistance to projects backed by China have been growing in ASEAN. 
In the second half of 2018, only USD 3.9 billion for 12 signed projects were settled, this 
was a decline of 33 percent which was worth USD 22 billion in 12 earlier months. In the 
second half of 2018 Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore received only a quarter 
of value compared to the value in 2017. Vietnam and Thailand had no projects signed in 
second half of 2018 (Zheng, 2019). According to the research of Vietnam Institute for 
Economic and Policy Research (VEPR), the overseas projects under BRI have been 
postponed or canceled mainly because of four following reasons:
The concerns about environmental issues
Concerns about social issues
Lack of transparency and high corruption in Chinese cooperation
The rise of Chinese military power and the intensity of territory conflicts between China 
and its neighbors prompt governments doubtful and cautious on the possibility that the 
infrastructure projects will be used as political leverage (Pham, 2019). This makes sense 
when looking into the actual situations in countries with the BRI in South East Asia. 
Countries that used to be regarded as “close” to China have announced to cancel or 
postpone BRI projects. The new concept of “debt trap policy” has recently been debated. 
This concept indicates that China tricks countries into huge projects, which create heavy 
debt burdens that are beyond their ability to pay back and these debtor countries become 
dependent on China and obey China’s arrangement.
A research on 95 grand projects invested by China with a total of 52 billion USD from 
1984-2008 and 806 infrastructure projects invested by developed countries showed that: (1) 
expenses of China invested projects are 30.6 percent higher than the original planned 
expenses, (2) 55 percent of Chinese projects are not economically efficient in their life 
cycle, (3) 17 percent of projects that have profit have it lower than expected (Ansar, 
Flyvbjerg, Budzier & Lumn, 2016). This research implies that huge investment in grand 
infrastructure projects seem to be beneficial to China only since China has enough 
capacities that are qualified for grand projects (China has their own capital and does not 
need to get debt from other creditors). This research emphasizes that taking loans for huge 
infrastructure projects is not a good path for poorer countries.
The BRI projects in South East Asia have faced barriers which come from political and 
financial concerns. In term of finance, projects in BRI with a loan from China are usually 
with a very high interest. In 2018 in his election campaign, Mahathir (Prime Minister of 
Malaysia) said about the scenario of losing the country if being in huge debt with China: 
“China comes with a lots of money and say that you can borrow from them, but you have to 
think how to pay them back. Some countries just look at the projects and do not care about 
how to pay them back, in this way they lose their country piece by piece. We, Malaysia do 
not want this happen” (Hookway & Ngui, 2018). In mid-January 2019, Mahathir Mohamad 
announced to cancel the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) project with the contractor China 
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Communications Construction Co Ltd (CCCC) and agreed to compensate for this. Malaysia 
said that they are not able to pay for the high cost of the loan interest for the ECRL. The 
ECRL was the second largest project under the BRI in terms of cost. Not long before, 
Mahathir also announced the cancelation of the natural gas pipeline project backed by 
China in Sabah in the East of Malaysia (Reuters, 2019; Tuoi Tre, 2019). 
Signature projects in connectivity such as railways projects in Indonesia and Thailand have 
been either delayed or renegotiated. Projects in Malaysia and Cambodia have faced 
skepticism about the geo-strategic and economic interests from host countries. The BRI is 
called a debt-trap, where host countries become the victims of miscalculation and are 
trapped by Chinese manipulation. The most significant example is the Hambantota Port in 
Sri Lanka. A 80 percent stake of the port was leased to the Chinese company China 
Merchants Port Holdings for 99 years according to the swap agreement signed by the end 
of 2017 (South China Morning Post, 2017). If the debtor cannot manage to make loan 
payment on schedule, debt forgiveness swap agreement is a consequence solution that what 
was done in Hambantota Port’s case. 
The majority of countries participating in the BRI are more vulnerable and weaker than 
China. It is highly possible that they are unable to pay back their loans to China and would 
use other methods such as political support or lease swap agreement in return for debt 
forgiveness. Therefore, the BRI is not only about economic benefit, but China leverages the 
BRI to realize its ambitious goal of becoming the global leader by using economic power to 
gain political or geo-strategic influence. China has been handling its ties with Southeast 
Asia by seeking to dominate individual states and divide ASEAN. It is absolutely clear that 
the South China Sea disputes is the high-profile issue refraining ASEAN countries from 
participating in the BRI.
One of the characteristics of Chinese investors is that they aim at countries that are in geo-
strategic positions, and those that they can develop geo-strategic knots with. In his speech 
in May 2017, President Xi mentioned that security development is the most important 
issue, and is the key to the solution for the regional security. This meant that the top leaders 
want to attach the security to the economic development- this was later written in the While 
Paper 2016 and Asia-pacific Security Cooperation White Paper 2017 (Huotari, Gaspers, 
Eder, Legarda & Mokry, 2017). In this way, when assessing projects proposed by China, 
the security benefits should not be separated from economic values. Although many BRI 
projects seems to be not economically beneficial (financially risky, or with a low 
probability of payback), they are still in progress, because these projects are in countries 
that are either rich in natural resources, or geo-graphically strategic on (1) military; (2) 
supply chain; (3) vital in controlling some other countries. (Pham, 2019, p88). 
For example, in Southeast Asia Myanmar and Cambodia falls into categories 2 and 3. In 
Myanmar, China had built a gas pipeline from Kyaukpyu. This construction has used only 
one third of its capacity since its opening day in 2013. Another project is the oil pipeline 
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from Myanmar to Kunming, which did not move its first oil until 2017. These two costly 
projects cost Myanmar 2.5 billion USD. However, for China this project is very important, 
since it secures China an additional fuel supply route so that they are not completely 
dependent on the Malacca strait. China surpassed Japan as the country with the second 
highest oil consumption volume. In 2016 China imported 7.6 million oil barrels per day. 
With this oil consumption growth and the growth of population, it was forecasted that in 
2022 China will need 9.4 million barrels per day, and in 2030 the number will be 4.5 billion 
per day. According to the calculation of International Energy Agency (IEA) and 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 2035 fuel 
consumption of China will be double that of the USA, three times the EU’s and 2.5 times 
India’s (International Energy Agency, 2013). For China, the Malacca strait is a very 
important both geo-politically and geo-strategically. 82 percent of China’s imported oil 
from Africa and Middle East are transported through the Malacca strait. According to a 
calculation of the US Department of Defense, the gas pipeline in Myanmar can replace 11 
percent of imported fuel that are transported to China through the Malacca strait. In case 
that the Malacca strait is closed, the BRI projects in Central Asia, Russia, Myanmar help 
China self-supply 15-18 percent of oil and 78 percent of gas out of the volume imported 
through Malacca strait (Department of Defense, 2019)
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Chapter 7: The reality of the BRI implementation in 
Vietnam and the impact of the BRI on the security policies 
of Vietnam
Previous chapter give us a general view on how BRI is implemented in Southeast Asia as 
well as the reaction of Southeast Asian governments to BRI projects in their countries. In 
this chapter I will discuss the reality of BRI implementation in Vietnam from the 
Vietnamese government point of view both on the diplomatic surface and in the actual 
reality of projects named under BRI in Vietnam.
7. 1 The diplomatic reaction of Vietnamese government to 
the BRI
In terms of connectivity via sea route, Vietnam is the bridge from China to Central Asia as 
Vietnam has a long coastline and a system of seaports. Without the participation of 
Vietnam, the BRI, especially the MSR will lose important connections between Southern 
China to Central Asia. In term of infrastructure, Vietnam possess better network of logistics 
and facilities compared to Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. The availability of these 
networks helps reducing the expenses of building new facilities in the MSR. Besides, in 
term of geopolitics, Vietnam has participated in multilateral co-operations with many 
countries by signing 16 Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with the EU, Japan and India. This 
implies that Vietnam has the good geopolitical position in Southeast Asia. If Vietnam joins 
the BRI actively and enthusiastically, Vietnam can be an example for countries which, 
despite of the tension on territorial disputes with China, still welcome and is a member of 
the BRI. China needs the participation of countries like Vietnam to set example for other 
partners to join the BRI (Pham, 2017, p. 283). Joining the BRI is the chance for Vietnam to 
take advantage of investment sources and trade with China and with other countries in the 
BRI. Without Vietnam, China will still promote the BRI in Southeast Asia, but with much 
higher expenses. Vietnam should know exactly its position, strengths and weaknesses so 
that it can be active and selective in joining the BRI. 
On the side of Vietnam, this country is currently in need of investment sources for 
infrastructure and transportation development. Therefore, the BRI is a good option for 
Vietnam to consider about when searching for a financial channel. As a part in the MSR, 
Vietnam has the opportunity to take advantage of the investments from the BRI to develop 
infrastructure, roads, railways, ports, power stations etc., however this also hints that the 
presence of China in Vietnam will be increasing. Vietnam sees the BRI as opportunity as 
well as a challenge. Vietnam can benefit from joining the MSR in terms of building 
transportation networks to connect northern Vietnam and southern Chinese provinces such 
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as Yunnan and Guangxi (Nguyen, 2017). Apart from transportation and infrastructure 
development, energy infrastructure is another key element in the agenda which diversifies 
the investment portfolio in the MSR. With the USA’s withdrawal from the TPP (Trans-
Pacific Partnership), Vietnam finds itself less attractive for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
flows. Thus joining the MSR helps Vietnam solve the problem of lacking funds. In this 
context, Chinese aid, investment and loans under the BRI seem to be a good option for 
Vietnam in reaching its development targets. In addition, by joining the BRI, Vietnam and 
China’s regional connectivity is enhanced in terms of physical connection as well as 
personnel and cultural exchange. 
Vietnam is one of the founder members of the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) 
and joined it in the beginning phase of this institution. On 24 October 2014 Vietnam was 
one of 20 Asian countries to sign the MOU for the establishment of AIIB. Vietnam’s 
participation on AIIB at this time implied that Vietnam has created the opportunity for itself 
to join building an international financial institution which would enhance the position of 
Vietnam in the international public. However, at the time of 2014, signing the MOU of the 
AIIB establishment did not mean that Vietnam showed its support or willingness to join the 
BRI. It was understandable, as 2014 was a tough year for the diplomacy of China and 
Vietnam because of the HD-981 crisis. One year later in November 2015, during Mr. 
President Xi’s state visit to Vietnam, two countries mentioned for the first time about 
Vietnam joining the BRI. Afterwards, in the official announcement it was said that “...two 
countries strengthen the bilateral strategic connection and reinforce the cooperation on 
TCOB and BRI…” (Tuoitre, 2015). Again, on the state visit to China of Prime Minister 
Nguyen Xuan Phuc in September 2016, two parties repeated the content of “...improve the 
investment and strategic connection between two countries, promote researches and 
projects under TCOB and BRI…” (DucTuan, 2016). 
Further, in the BRI forum in Beijing in May 2017, the late President Tran Dai Quang said 
that Vietnam warmly welcomes the projects to connect and develop the economy in the 
region in general and the signature BRI of President Xi in specific with the idea of 
“peacefully cooperate for a win-win benefit” (Nhan Dan, 2017). On January 2017 General 
Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong paid a state visit to China and the two parties repeated 
discussing their agreement on the BRI. In May 2017 Vietnam showed its support and 
willingness to join the BRI by attending the Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation (BRFIC) in Beijing. Vietnam remarked its support and willingness to join the 
BRI by signing the MOU of combining the TCOB and the BRI in Hanoi in November 2017 
when President Xi visited Vietnam for the second time. Showing the diplomatic support for 
the BRI is the signal that Vietnam is in active position to react to the BRI, Vietnam regards 
the bilateral cooperation is the important basis for the two countries. However, Vietnam’s 
joining the BRI with caution and concerns is explainable due to the traditional political 
distrust. It can be seen by the fact that it was not until President Xi paid his second state 
visits to Vietnam within three years (November 2015 and November 2017) that two 
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counties signed the MOU where they agreed to combine the TCOB into the BRI.
On the sideline of the 12th Asia Europe meeting summit in Brussel Belgium on 18 October 
2018, Vietnam and China reached the consensus of cooperation which aims at encouraging 
the firmer friendship and the stronger communication, which will cement the public support 
for their relation. Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang reinforced Vietnam to bear in mind 
the big picture, while handling the maritime issue and safeguard the peace and stability in 
the South China Sea. 2018 was the landmark of ten years anniversary of comprehensive 
strategic partnership between China and Vietnam. Li said two countries are in position of a 
win-win, China will sustain the tight cooperation with Vietnam. From Vietnam side, Prime 
Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc said that Vietnam would work with China to keep peace and 
stability in the South China Sea as well as further support the development of bilateral ties 
(Xinhua, 2018).
All in all, one can argue that Vietnam’s attitude to the BRI has the following characteristic: 
-Vietnam has turned to be more active by agreements on the economic cooperation 
which is the mainstream in China-Vietnam relations.
- When joining the BRI, Vietnam concerns were related to political trust. This was 
proved by the fact that it was not until President Xi paid his second visit to Vietnam 
within 3 years that two countries reached a MOU on combining the TCOB and the 
BRI.
- Vietnam’s attitude towards the BRI was calculated based on concerns about 
strategy and security rather than economic need.
- Other than the opinion of the top leaders of Vietnam have been officially 
published, opinions about the BRI from the elite group have been very rare. This 
implies that it seems to be that the government’s attitude towards the BRI has been 
reserved and thoroughly calculated.
7. 2 The actual implementation of the BRI in Vietnam
It has been 6 years since the BRI was announced for the first time, and 4 years since 
Vietnam confirmed its support for the BRI by signing the MOU in November 2017 in 
Hanoi. Based on the content of cooperation of Vietnam and China on the BRI in the 
document in 2015, the field of cooperation are various: Infrastructure (highway; sea port; 
high-speed railway); Commercial Cooperation (Special Economic Zones); Finance (AIIB); 
and Policy connection. However, the negotiation and development of the projects have 
been very slow and not efficient. For example, the intercity railway Cat Linh-Ha Dong was 
started in 2008, but still it is not in use. Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s intention on 
getting loans from AIIB in 2017 was also postponed. None of the loans have been 
disbursed. Most of the cooperation are in negotiation and commitment signing steps. 
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Like in many other countries, one characteristic of undergoing the BRI projects in Vietnam 
is that projects are rebranded. Meaning that these projects had been started before 2013-
2014, but nowadays they are renamed under the BRI. The typical projects of this kind are 
the railway Cat Linh-Ha Dong; projects in the TCOB and the Vinh Tan electric power 
plant. Because Vietnam rarely publishes their government’s opinion or official information 
about the BRI and do not announce the list of projects under it, this research’s information 
about the BRI projects in Vietnam is mainly based on the following documents: 
- The general state announcement of two countries
- Information on BRI projects in Vietnam that are in news of Vietnam and China
- Researches of WB, ADB, AIIB
- The official announcement on November 2017 that confirmed China’s and 
Vietnam’s combined two projects TCOB and BRI together.
- Based on the Yidaiyilu website of China, it can be defined that the following 
projects of Vietnam are under BRI: Vinh Tan 1 electricity power plant (2013-2017); 
Intercity Railway Cat Linh-Ha Dong (2008-now); Some projects on transportation 
infrastructure in the northern area; some projects in southern area that were planned 
to get loans from AIIB; Cooperation projects of SBV and AIIB.
7. 3 Concerns and cautions of the Vietnamese government 
on BRI
When Vietnam participates in the BRI either for diplomatic gesture or in an enthusiastic 
way, Vietnam will face traditional and non-traditional security challenges. 
7.3.1 Traditional security challenges
So far, the announcement of the Vietnamese government on the BRI emphasizes the active 
role of Vietnam in joining this initiative and connecting the BRI with the TCOB that 
Vietnam proposed in 2004. However, government’s official announcement on the BRI 
rarely has appeared on media. This has implied that the Vietnamese government is cautious 
about and carefully responsive to the influence of BRI. The concerns on security issues 
have been mainly raised by scholars rather than the government.
In one paper in the Communist magazine - the Press Office of the Communist Party, Mr. 
Tran Viet Thai said that in terms of economy and security, ASEAN has two worries about 
the BRI. Firstly, all counties in ASEAN are worried about the imbalance in the relation 
with China as China’s economy and power has become stronger very fast since 1990. 
Secondly, the MRS will not be in harmony with the MPAC (Master Plan on ASEAN 
Connectivity) and will hamper the center role of ASEAN in Southeast Asia. Territorial 
conflicts and fierce actions of China on the South China Sea render many ASEAN 
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countries demotivated to join the BRI (Tran Viet Thai, 2017). In a few comments from the 
Vietnamese Defense Ministry, they also showed concerns that ASEAN would become 
over-dependent on the Chinese economy and had to shape their ideology in the ways that 
are supportive for Chinese diplomacy in the regional and international arena. In addition, 
many in the ASEAN also worry about the general geo-political picture due to the fact that 
China has been increasing their army capacity and the naval power. Finally, the role of 
ASEAN will become subordinate and the unity of ASEAN will be jeopardized by the BRI 
(Le& Bui, 2017).
Despite of the benefits that Vietnam could gain from joining the BRI, what concerns 
Vietnam most is the over dependency of its economy on China and the national security 
when joining the BRI. Increasing dependency on China can be seen by the increased 
presence of Chinese investors in Vietnam. Chinese investors bring along Chinese 
technology, materials and labor. In addition, the influx of goods and services from China 
can risk with Vietnam trade deficit. Moreover, loans from China can make the public debt 
even worse. The more serious concern is the national security. The MSR is regarded as a 
signal of Chinese hegemony which is related to Chinese claim on the South China Sea. 
Territorial disputes on the South China Sea is a sensitive and strongly emotional topic to 
the Vietnamese. According to a research by Pew Research center, up to 60 percent of 
Vietnamese people consider territorial disputes with China a serious threat to national 
security and independence (Nguyen, 2017). As discussed above, in 2014, crowds gathered 
on streets in big cities of Vietnam to protest China setting up the oil rig Haiyou 981 in the 
claimed waters by Vietnam in South China Sea. 
Vietnam has proved to be the most skeptical country in South East Asia about the BRI. 
Vietnam has approved strict investment conditions and regulation to the BRI projects for 
the sake of its economic self-reliance (Ghiasi, Fei & Saalman, 2018). In addition, the 
skepticism on the Chinese BRI also came from the bad reputation of Chinese investments 
in Vietnam previously. Vietnam’s first project labeled under the BRI is the light railway 
Cat Linh Ha Dong which was under the construction by China Railway Sixth Group. A part 
of this railway project is financed by the BRI with a sum of 650 million USD. This project 
is an important landmark under the framework of the BRI (Liyang, 2017). This undergoing 
project has revealed a number of mistakes and wrongdoings which have negatively 
impacted Vietnamese perception on the quality of Chinese oversea investments. This is 
contrary to the situation of the similar intra-city railway project by Japanese investor, 
namely the Ben Thanh Metro in Ho Chi Minh city, which has received praise and positive 
attitude from public.
According to Pham in his book (2019), there are 2 traditional security main concerns that 
are (1) How is the BRI related to the South China Sea when the conflicts are not resolved 
and influenced the benefit of Vietnam, and (2) that the attraction of the BRI to Cambodia 
and Laos may weaken the strength of their relationship to Vietnam in terms of defense 
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security. 
7.3.2 Non-traditional securities challenge 
Non-traditional security concerns can be fuel security and economic security which can 
raise the threat to the legitimate status of the ruling party. In addition, in Vietnam, there is 
another kind of security challenge that the government has to face – the anti-China 
sentiment. Anti-China sentiment among the Vietnamese public is another factor that makes 
Vietnam-China relation tough. This sentiment is toxic, and can be an obstacle to the 
Politburo. Controlling the reaction of the public to China is meaningful to the Vietnamese 
government. If the anti-China sentiment of the public is strong, it is disadvantageous for the 
Vietnamese government in balancing its relationship with China and with other stronger 
countries, because the social and political stability will be threatened. Therefore, the BRI is 
a challenge when the government has to seek the solution to control public reactions to 
ensure a stable, cooperative and trustful policy environment which is the primary condition 
for long-term bilateral relation. 
The anti-China waves of demonstrations in 2014-2015 indicated an important change in the 
way the government managed this issue. When China put the oil rig HD 981 in the EZZ of 
Vietnam, groups of people poured into the streets in big cities of Vietnam to show their 
angers and anti-China sentiments. These activities soon became violent destroying foreign 
enterprise assets. This situation created the Vietnamese government two tough challenges: 
(1) When the essential benefit (the territory) is threatened, what government should do to 
perform their responsibility as the national leader? (2) How would the government do to 
calm down the public in order not to create negative results? The announcements from the 
Press Office of the Government, intellectual elites and scholars showed their new roles in 
controlling the situation. 
According to Nhung Bui (2016), in the anti-China crisis, despite using strong words against 
China, Vietnamese top leaders also tried to avoid using nationalism as a motive. Instead, 
media transformed the anger of the public and the anti-China sentiment into a new positive 
way of supporting the government. Three characteristics of the way government used to 
solve the HD-981 crisis were: (1) That it was difficult for the government to choose any 
soft solution for this territorial threatening crisis. (2) That the government tried not to abuse 
the nationalist spirit, since it could have caused uncontrolled situation, so the government 
transformed the national spirit into public support. (3) That under the circumstances, the 
government took the priority of solving conflict with China by diplomacy and in peaceful 
way. Managing foreign policy on China was an important point in the public press strategy 
of the government (Bui. Trang Nhung, 2016). After the HD-981 crisis the government has 
changed their way of managing issues with China by seeking cooperation to solve the 
conflict. This is showed by the increase in the state visits of two countries’ top leaders and 
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the growth in the bilateral cooperation.
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Conclusions: The influence of the conflicts on the South 
China Sea between Vietnam and China on Vietnam’s 
joining the BRI
According to Kuik (2018), three factors that can be used to define the influence of the BRI 
on the Southeast Asian countries: economic benefits; political ideology and security issue; 
and the ability to sanction/ punish. These factors can be used to analyze the situation for 
Vietnam too.
China has offered Vietnam to finance projects that allow Vietnam to get funds and support 
from China. Investment in infrastructure will boost the Vietnamese economy and attract 
overseas investment into Vietnam. However, the investment in infrastructure requires a 
huge amount of capital. Since Vietnam became the country with average income, the low 
interest loan sources have been reduced. In addition, the public debt is high, balancing the 
funds for internal investment is not easy. China’s cooperation offers to bring along the 
economic benefits that the Vietnamese government is interested in. However, the issue 
about the political ideology and foreign policy with China is another side of the coin for the 
Vietnamese government to consider. Managing the relation with China in a stable 
trajectory, increasing the trust and exploiting the benefits will hinder the potential bilateral 
conflicts. The Vietnamese government are looking for lessening the risk of threat to 
national territory correctly and maintaining the political stability.
The Philippines is a good example for a country that hedges relations with China. These 
two countries had a territorial conflict, but they can find a way to balance it by economic 
cooperation. Tight economic cooperation will open ways for communication channels to 
settle down the political conflict in a peaceful way. For Vietnam, the demand for the 
investments in infrastructure which encourage economic development is high. However, 
the funds from government and private entities are not enough and limited. Therefore, the 
BRI is a golden chance for Vietnam, as the BRI offers generous funds to diverse receivers 
(not only state-owned but private entities as well).
It can be observed from media and government’s diplomatic gestures that Vietnamese 
officials are very quiet about their misgivings on the BRI. While it usually gives diplomatic 
support to the BRI, for example Vietnam became the member of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015, Vietnam generally has reacted to the BRI with caution 
and taken careful calculations. The evidence was that it took Vietnam two years to sign the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China on the BRI. This reservation from the 
Vietnamese government can be interpreted as the result from the profound distrust between 
the two countries and the rising anti-China sentiment in Vietnamese public ignited from the 
2014 oil rig crisis. Although Vietnamese government diplomatically proposed the BRI 
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which was a necessary step in diplomatic operations. The story is far different from the 
point of view of the implementation of the BRI in Vietnam. Former President Tran Dai 
Quang emphasized the principles of mutual respect, equality, consensus and compliance 
with the international law compliance and the UN charter. This implied the fact that 
Vietnam is concerned about the political, economic and strategic implications of the BRI 
which can be transcended into ‘excessive dependence’ on China and harm Vietnam’s 
territorial and maritime claim in South China Sea (Le, 2018).
The ongoing disputes on the South China Sea undeniably determine Vietnam’s perception 
of the BRI. Not mentioning the historical grievances and distrust between the two 
countries, the conflict of interest between Vietnam and China basically comes from the fact 
that China has been increasing its presence and asserting its territory claim over 90 percent 
of the South China Sea which include the Paracel and Spratly Islands that Vietnam has 
been actively claiming as her own territory. As China and other claimants in the South 
China Sea have failed in resolving territorial disputes by diplomatic methods, this has led to 
massive distrust and self-protection by arms build-up in Southeast Asia. Vietnam has been 
one of the most active in pushing back China’s activities in the South China Sea when 
China put the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in 2014 in the disputed waters and setting up the 
nuclear-capable bomber H-6K in 2018. Vietnam has upgraded its military budget by 127 
percent to $5 billion in 2017 compared to $2.2 billion in 2006 (Zachary &Nguyen, 2016). 
In 2017 Vietnam became the world’s 11th biggest weapon recipient (Ghiasi, Fei & Saalman, 
2018). In addition, Vietnam has been upgrading security cooperation with major countries 
such as the USA, Japan and India. Vietnam has strongly denounced the activities of China 
in the South China Sea and regarded them as provocation for tension and damaging the 
regional stability especially in the context where the ASEAN countries are working on the 
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. 
If the disputes and tension become greater and more serious, Vietnam will be even more 
sensitive to political and strategic implications of the BRI. In contrast, in a better situation 
when tensions and disputes can be solved peacefully and maintained calm and parties can 
achieve the consensus on maritime disputes for example the singing of the COC, Vietnam 
will be more willing to join the BRI. To sum up, it is not doubtful that the BRI will face 
greater challenge in Vietnam than it does in other Southeast Asian countries. Although BRI 
implementation is slow in Vietnam, Hanoi still goes on supporting it by diplomatic 
gestures. It is beneficial for Vietnam if it successes in maneuvering for taking advantage of 
the BRI to build up infrastructure, while not dampening its political motivation and staying 
persistent to its agenda on the South China Sea issues (Le, 2018). Vietnam is on the cusp of 
a dilemma between the political implications of the MSR (Maritime Silk Road) and its 
current demand for the expansion of its infrastructure. What Vietnam is facing now is not 
the question of joining the BRI, but how Vietnam is able to alleviate the risks related to 
higher engagement with China in the economy, and also how to maximize the benefits from 
Chinese loans and aid. The situation threatens the legitimacy of the Vietnamese Communist 
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Party if it chooses to ally with the Chinese Communist Party.
Beijing has been utilizing many methods to expand influence in Hanoi and force Hanoi to 
fall within China’s orbit. Hanoi is in different position from many other countries in the 
region, and the influence of China on Hanoi faces many obstacles. China and Vietnam both 
have the Communist parties, which allows China to use the card of socialism to tie Vietnam 
and China into a strong ideological bond. In the Vietnamese Politburo, there are always the 
endless controversial arguments on “to which extent to oppose China” and “to which 
extend to compromise”. According to Thayer (2019), Beijing has been interfering in 
choosing members of the Vietnamese Politburo and always preventing potential candidates 
who are regarded as anti-China from being chosen into Vietnamese Politburo (VOA, 2019)
China is a powerful country, so for Vietnam it is better to have good diplomatic 
relationship and cooperation with China rather than criticizing and becoming its enemy. If 
you hurt China, China will hurt you more badly. The way Vietnam chooses to behave in the 
relationship with China is important, since the two countries share borders. Vietnam is a 
small country with a population equivalent to the one of a medium size province of China, 
so what benefits Vietnam can gain from being enemy of China and how can Vietnam 
impose influence on the giant neighbor like China? The current Vietnamese Communist 
Party leaders show their willingness of making a good diplomatic relationship and co-
operation with China. Vietnamese leaders want to have investments from China and make a 
commitment to join the BRI. However, Hanoi does not wants bilateral relationship with 
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